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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal hearing examiners—that is, administrative law judges 
before they were called “administrative law judges”—were crucial 
figures in the movement to reform administrative law in the 1930s, 
1940s, and 1950s.  In the early years of the administrative process, 
Americans were increasingly apprehensive about the fact that 
bureaucrats—and particularly hearing examiners—were becoming 
the primary makers of federal law and policy.  Complaints about 
examiners were easily conflated with complaints about the agencies 
(and vice versa).  Given their role handling initial fact-finding 
hearings in highly political regulatory disputes, the examiners were 
believed by many critics to be potentially lawless figures who abused
their decision-making powers to help their agencies deprive regulated 
parties of their property rights. 2 Without the neutrality or 
2 For scholarship on the early development of the administrative state, see 
BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL 
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); MATTHEW A. CRENSON,
THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA 
(1975); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE 
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); 
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900
(1982); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); Michael Nelson, A Short, Ironic History 
of American National Bureaucracy, 44 J. POL. 747 (1982); Gautham Rao, The 
Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-
Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2008). 
Studies examining the development and expansion of regulatory authority 
in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century include WILLIAM R.
BROCK, INVESTIGATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1865–1900 (1984); DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF 
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION 
IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001); ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE 
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941); SAMUEL P. HAYS, AMERICAN 
POLITICAL HISTORY AS SOCIAL ANALYSIS: ESSAYS (1980); KIMBERLY S. JOHNSON,
GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE: CONGRESS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM, 1877–
1929 (2006); MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY 
AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933 (1990); MORTON KELLER,
REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA,
1900–1933 (1994); GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877–1916
(1965); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION 
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1963); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF 
REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS,
ALFRED E. KAHN (1984); AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN 
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FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–
1929 (2013); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS 
AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995); ELIZABETH SANDERS,
ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE 1877–1917
(1999); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM, 1890–1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988); TRACY L.
STEFFES, SCHOOL, SOCIETY, AND STATE: A NEW EDUCATION TO GOVERN MODERN 
AMERICA, 1890–1940 (2012); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN 
STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920
(1982); DAVID B. TYACK, THOMAS JAMES, & AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE 
SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785–1954 (1987); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE 
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877–1920 (1967); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING 
AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION,
1865–1920 (2001). 
For scholarship on the New Deal and post-New Deal state, see BRIAN 
BALOGH, CHAIN REACTION: EXPERT DEBATE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN 
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER, 1945–1975 (1991); ALAN BRINKLEY, 
THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995) 
[hereinafter BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM]; Alan Brinkley, The Late New Deal 
and the Idea of the State, in LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 37, 37–62 (1998) 
[hereinafter Brinkley, The Late New Deal]; LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’
REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003); 
KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW 
DEAL (1995); ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF 
MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966); MEG JACOBS,
POCKETBOOK POLITICS: ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (2005); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW 
DEAL (1970); DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, 1946–
1999 (2000); JASON SCOTT SMITH, BUILDING NEW DEAL LIBERALISM: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 1933–1956 (2006); BARTHOLOMEW H.
SPARROW, FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: WORLD WAR II AND THE AMERICAN STATE 
(1996); BRIAN WADDELL, THE WAR AGAINST THE NEW DEAL: WORLD WAR II AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001); Brian Balogh, Reorganizing the Organizational 
Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in Modern America, 5 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 119 (1991); Michael K. Brown, State Capacity and Political Choice: 
Interpreting the Failure of the Third New Deal, 9 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 187 
(1995); John J. Coleman, State Formation and the Decline of Political Parties: 
American Parties in the Fiscal State, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 195 (1994); Marc 
Allen Eisner, Discovering Patterns in Regulatory History: Continuity, Change, and 
Regulatory Regimes, 6 J. POL’Y HIST. 157 (1994); John W. Jeffries, The “New” 
New Deal: FDR and American Liberalism, 1937–1945, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 397
(1990); Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, & Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The 
Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 283 (1993); Ira 
Katznelson & Bruce Pietrykowski, Rebuilding the American State: Evidence from 
the 1940s, 5 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 301 (1991); Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, 
Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on 
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independence of judges, examiners were free (critics alleged) to be 
biased and unfair, thus tainting agency proceedings as a whole. 
This focus on the examiners motivated subsequent reform.  
Although the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure, which released a comprehensive study of the 
the 1940s, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 689 (1998); David Plotke, The Endurance of New Deal 
Liberalism, 10 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 415 (1996). 
For studies of the development of administrative law and administrative 
organizations, see MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR., CONTINUITY AND DISRUPTION: ESSAYS 
IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1996); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); PAUL 
C. LIGHT, THE TIDES OF REFORM: MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK, 1945–1995
(1997); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF 
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979); JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1986); Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in 
the Administrative State: World War II and the Decline of Expert Administration, 
in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II
(Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002) [hereinafter Schiller, Reining in the 
Administrative State]; HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER: THE 
DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 1998); G. Edward White, The 
Emergence of Agency Government and the Creation of Administrative Law, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 94 (2000); James E. Brazier, An Anti-New 
Dealer Legacy: The Administrative Procedure Act, 8 J. POL’Y HIST. 206 (1996); 
Ronald A. Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363 (1986); 
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276 (1984); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); James G. March & Johan P. Olson, Organizing 
Political Life: What Administrative Reorganization Tells Us About Government, 77 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 281(1983); Ann Marshall Young, Judicial Independence in 
Administrative Adjudication: Past, Present, and Future, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 101 (1999); Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: 
Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 267 (1990); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in 
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging 
the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of 
Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389 (2000) [hereinafter Schiller, 
Enlarging the Administrative Polity]; Reuel Schiller, “Saint George and the 
Dragon”: Courts and the Development of the Administrative State in Twentieth-
Century America, 17 J. POL’Y HIST. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 110 (2005); George B. 
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from 
New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); 
Jessica Wang, Imagining the Administrative State: Legal Pragmatism, Securities 
Regulation, and New Deal Liberalism, 17 J. POL’Y HIST. 257 (2005); Nicholas S. 
Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative Law, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119 (1997).
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administrative process in 1941, found little evidence of actual 
unfairness, its members were concerned with the damage that the 
perception of unfairness did to administrative governance.  Their 
recommendations, then, sought to give the examiners less 
opportunity to engage in potentially lawless behavior.  The Attorney 
General’s Committee also questioned the examiners’ skills and 
expertise, and offered other recommendations aimed at making the 
examiners more capable and giving them a larger role in the 
decision-making process.  The work of the Attorney General’s 
Committee significantly influenced the Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946 (APA), which moved to improve the examiners at the same 
time it constrained their discretion by formalizing the initial hearings 
and removing the agency’s (presumably pernicious) influence on 
examiners. Such reforms, many hoped, would make it more difficult 
for examiners to simply impose their own (or the agency head’s) 
preferences on the proceedings. 
Debates about the capacity, fairness, and independence of 
examiners continued under the APA.  In 1951, the Supreme Court 
held in Universal Camera v. NLRB that, while agencies and 
reviewing courts should take examiners’ reports seriously, their 
reports did not bind agency heads. 3 However improved the 
examiners might be, the APA had not fundamentally transformed 
examiners’ relationship to their agencies.  Efforts to implement the 
hearing examiner provisions of the APA also raised questions about 
the fairness and capacity of those already serving as examiners.  
Although conservative lawyers were dubious about both, expertise 
trumped charges of bias when almost all of the examiners were 
ultimately (and controversially) reappointed to their positions.
By the 1950s, fairness—especially the fairness of the initial 
hearing—was no longer the most common concern about the 
agencies, as it became increasingly clear that the administrative 
process involved more than just the examiners and their fact-finding 
hearings.  In light of new criticisms of agency capture, slowness, and 
corruption, reformers seeking fairness by making examiners more 
independent and adding more steps to the process were 
unconvincing.  Agency processes and agency heads were the 
problem, not the examiners (who seemed the most professional of the 
lot).  The developments in administrative law thus indicate the extent 
3 Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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to which, during the first few decades after the New Deal, both 
supporters and opponents of the administrative process projected 
their hopes and fears onto the examiners.  As these changed, so too 
did proposals for administrative reform.  For several decades, 
examiner independence was inextricable from fairness (the debate 
over professionalization was yet to come).
II. CRITICISM OF THE AGENCIES IN THE POST-NEW DEAL ERA
During the 1930s, rumors of bureaucrats’ bias and 
lawlessness flourished.  Although the constitutionality of New Deal 
programs was no longer in question by 1937 and a rich case law 
defined the boundaries of administrative due process, 4 questions 
4 See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 78-678, BD. OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH,
78TH CONG., REPORT ON PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF GOVERNMENTAL 
CONTROL (2d Sess. 1944); JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES 
TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960), in U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Committee Print, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess.), available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1960/
1960_1221_Landis_report.pdf; A SELECTION OF CASES UNDER THE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE ACT (Felix Frankfurter, ed., 2d ed. 1922); ERNST FREUND ET AL., THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1923); A. A. Berle, Jr., The 
Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV. 430 (1917); JOHN 
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1927); GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (1924); LOWI, 
supra note 2; ISAIAH LEO SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION:
A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (1931–1937); Felix 
Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614 (1927); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939 (2011); 
Roscoe Pound, The Growth of Administrative Justice, 2 WIS. L. REV. 321 (1924); 
Robert L. Rabin, supra note 2, at 1320; Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative 
Polity, supra note 2; Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme 
Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565 (2011).  
Daniel Ernst has coined the term “procedural Diceyism” to describe the 
phenomenon in which courts “accorded administrators a great deal of freedom 
from judicial oversight, as long as they handled disputes in ways that mimicked the 
courts.”  Daniel Ernst, Morgan and the New Dealers, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 447, 449 
(2008) [hereinafter Ernst, Morgan and the New Dealers].  See also Daniel R. Ernst, 
The Politics of Administrative Law: New York’s Anti-Bureaucracy Clause and the 
O’Brian–Wagner Campaign of 1938, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 331 (2009) [hereinafter 
Ernst, The Politics of Administrative Law].
                                                 
Spring 2014 The Hearing Examiners 7
remained about the agencies and commissions that administered 
federal programs. The departments, bureaus, agencies, and 
commissions that complicated the federal organizational chart 
remained an easy political target for lawyers and politicians 
motivated not just by anti-New Deal animus, but also concerns about 
federal spending and centralized power that indicated a very real 
discomfort with the changing nature of governance.5 Concerns about 
subversion were also present; as one lawyer plaintively inquired in 
1940: “Is the Administrative Process a Fifth Column?”6
One of the most common complaints concerned the fairness 
of the formal, quasi-judicial hearings that occurred in the small 
number of licensing, rate-making, or enforcement cases not resolved 
informally.  These proceedings were targeted far out of proportion to 
their frequency, largely because they both resembled and sharply 
diverged from the courtroom model through which property rights 
were more commonly adjudicated. 7 In these initial fact-finding 
hearings, “hearing examiners” heard testimony, received evidence, 
and drafted nonbinding initial reports to be used by commissioners 
and agency heads issuing final orders.8 Practices varied, but often 
the examiner was the agency staffer who had handled the case since 
5 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA (1976); JONATHAN BELL, THE LIBERAL STATE ON TRIAL: THE 
COLD WAR AND AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE TRUMAN YEARS (2004); DAVID 
CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM (2006); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, YOUNG LAWYER FOR THE NEW DEAL: AN INSIDER’S MEMOIR OF THE 
ROOSEVELT YEARS (Joan P. Emerson ed., 1991); Joanna L. Grisinger, Law and the 
Administrative State, in A COMPANION TO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (Sally E. 
Hadden & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2012); Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal State and 
the Anti-Bureaucratic Tradition, in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY: CRITIQUE 
AND REAPPRAISAL 77 (Robert Eden ed., 1989); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL 
LAWYERS (1982); BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES 
FROM 1915 TO 1945 (1983); ANNE MIRA KORNHAUSER, SAVING LIBERALISM:
POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY (2004); RONEN SHAMIR,
MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995); 
White, supra note 2; Marver H. Bernstein, The Politics of Adjudication, 16 J. POL.
299 (1954); Ronald A. Cass, supra note 2, at 364; Ernst, The Politics of 
Administrative Law, supra note 4; Ralph F. Fuchs, Symposium on Administrative 
Law, 9 AM. L. SCH. REV. 139, 139 (1939); Barry D. Karl, Constitution and Central 
Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, SUP. CT. REV., 1988, at 163.
6 Samuel Kaufman, Is the Administrative Process a Fifth Column?, 6 J.
MARSHALL L. Q. 1 (1940).
7 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 20.
8 Id.
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the initial complaint was filed.9 In some agencies, due to agency 
preference, the complexity of the case, or budget constraints, a single 
examiner might both conduct the hearing and represent the agency’s 
views.10 Before and after a hearing, examiners might consult with 
other agency employees about the case in question, and, during the 
hearing, examiners often questioned parties and witnesses themselves 
in an effort to improve the record.11
Although these practices were designed to maximize the 
agency’s institutional expertise, they also gave rise to criticism that 
these agency officials were abusing their power, tilting the 
proceedings toward their agency and against the private parties 
before them.12 Among the loudest critics was the American Bar 
Association (ABA), the traditionally conservative lawyers’ 
organization whose members balked at the combination of 
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication functions in 
administrative hearings. 13 ABA Special Committee on
Administrative Law chairman Roscoe Pound famously denounced 
the lawlessness of the administrative process in the committee’s 1938 
report, characterizing agency governance as “administrative 
absolutism,” inconsistent with due process and the rule of law.14
Taking for granted that the administrative process was deficient and 
not nearly enough like that of courts, the ABA sought to restrain 
examiners’ discretion and reform the initial hearing.15
Revelations about the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) practices provided ammunition for critics 
skeptical of agency decision-making.  In the Supreme Court’s 1938 
decision in Morgan v. United States, the Court concluded that the 
USDA, in issuing a 1933 order fixing maximum rates for the sale of 
9 Id.
10 Id. at 21. 
11 Id.
12 Chester T. Lane, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1008, 1011 (1954) 
(reviewing LLOYD D. MUSOLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW 
AND ADMINISTRATION (1953)).
13 For more on the ABA’s proposals, see Brazier, supra note 2; Shepherd, 
supra note 2.
14 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 331, 343 (1938).
15 See supra note 13.
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livestock in the Kansas City Stock Yards, had not played fair.16
USDA staffers had enjoyed easy access to the Secretary of 
Agriculture, but, without an examiner’s report processing some 
10,000 pages of testimony and 1000 pages of exhibits produced 
during the initial hearing, and without an opportunity for a useful oral 
argument before the secretary, the stockmen’s agents had been 
essentially shut out of the decision-making process.17 The Court 
rejected the idea that the Secretary could adopt “the findings which 
have been prepared by the active prosecutors for the Government, 
after an ex parte discussion with them and without according any 
reasonable opportunity to the respondents in the proceeding to know 
the claims thus presented and to contest them.”18 Such an obvious 
preference for one side over the other failed to provide adequate due 
process to the regulated parties.19
Additional criticisms were lobbed by members of Congress 
concerned about the uncontrolled authority of administrative 
officials.20 Many of the charges of administrative unfairness focused 
on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), where, if critics 
were to be believed, the vast majority of examiners were unfairly 
16 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).  See JAMES HART, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, WITH SELECTED CASES (2d ed. 1950); A. 
H. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 
YALE L.J. 647 (1938); Kenneth C. Sears, The Morgan Case and Administrative 
Procedure, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 726 (1939); Frank J. Dugan, Note, A New 
Administrative Landmark, 27 GEO. L.J. 351 (1939); Irving Allan Lore, Recent 
Case, 12 WIS. L. REV. 245 (1937); Joseph Wise, Editorial Note, Morgan v. United 
States: Administrative Hearing, 12 U. CIN. L. REV. 598 (1938); Note, Aftermath of 
the Morgan Decisions, 25 IOWA L. REV. 622, 622–38 (1940); Note, Judicial 
Control of Administrative Procedure: The Morgan Cases, 52 HARV. L. REV. 509 
(1939); Note, Implications of the Second Morgan Decision, 33 ILL. L. REV. 227 
(1938); Recent Decisions, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1156 (1936); Recent Case, 7 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 110 (1938); Recent Case, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119 (1936); 
Recent Case Note, 14 IND. L.J. 164 (1938); Recent Decision, 13 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
138 (1938); see also Daniel J. Gifford, The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View, 
30 ADMIN. L. REV. 237 (1978).
17 Morgan, 304 U.S. at 16–18.
18 Id. at 22; see also Ernst, Morgan and the New Dealers, supra note 4; 
Tushnet, supra note 4. The Court excoriated a state public utilities commission for 
taking the idea of judicial notice too far a year earlier in Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
19 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 22.
20 Id. at 24. 
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biased.21 Some of the loudest attacks on the NLRB came from 
conservative Virginia Democrat Howard W. Smith, who launched a 
special investigation into whether the board was abusing its 
authority.22 During hearings in 1939 and 1940, the Smith Committee 
called out NLRB officials for incompetence, unethical behavior, and 
radical political beliefs. 23 Among other criticisms, the Smith 
Committee lambasted the NLRB’s initial hearing procedures and 
examiners’ practice of conferring with other board employees before, 
during, and after formal hearings.24 In addition, members criticized 
the NLRB’s review attorneys, who essentially served as middlemen 
at the board.25 These “juvenile jurists” (so described by one hostile 
observer) handled the cases after the examiners had completed their 
work; review attorneys reviewed the hearing transcripts and the 
examiners’ reports and presented cases to the board.26 This meant, 
21 For discussions of this critique of the NLRB, see Harold W. Davey, 
Separation of Functions and the National Labor Relations Board, 7 U. CHI. L. REV.
328 (1940); Charles Fahy, The Preparation and Trial of Cases Before the National 
Labor Relations Board, 25 A.B.A. J. 695 (1939); Walter Gellhorn & Seymour L. 
Linfield, Politics and Labor Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of NLRB 
Procedure, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1939); J. Warren Madden, Administrative 
Procedure: National Labor Relations Board, 45 W. VA. L. Q. 93 (1939) 
[hereinafter Madden, Administrative Procedure]; J. Warren Madden, The National 
Labor Relations Act and Its Administration, 18 TENN. L. REV. 127 (1943) 
[hereinafter Madden, The National Labor Relations Act].  See also Seymour Scher, 
The Politics of Agency Organization, 15 W. POL. Q. 328 (1962).  For scholarly 
studies of the NLRB in this period, see JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE 
LAW, 1933–1937 (1974) [hereinafter GROSS, THE MAKING]; JAMES A. GROSS, THE 
RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR 
POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1937–1947 (1981) [hereinafter GROSS, THE RESHAPING]; 
IRONS, supra note 5; CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS:
LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA,
1880–1960 (1985).
22 BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, KEEPER OF THE RULES: CONGRESSMAN HOWARD W.
SMITH OF VIRGINIA (1987); GROSS, THE RESHAPING, supra note 21.
23 See H.R. 1902, H. SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE NAT’L LABOR 
RELATIONS BD., 76TH CONG., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, INTERMEDIATE REPORT 36 (3d Sess. 1940) [hereinafter 
INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD].
24 Id. at 45; see GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 24–25.
25 INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 
23, at 45. 
26 Willard Edwards, Juvenile Jurists, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Aug. 24, 
1940, at 29.
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the Smith Committee alleged, that the review attorneys, reputed to be 
among the most radical at the NLRB, could and did slant cases 
according to their own questionable political sympathies.27
Defenders of the administrative process argued that this 
conflation of roles at the NLRB and elsewhere was less problematic 
than it might appear.28 Whereas judges played an active role in 
hearing testimony and determining the credibility of witnesses, 
examiners were more typically presented with masses of depositions, 
statistics, and other documentary evidence about which there was 
little controversy.29 Thus, unlike adversarial trials, administrative 
hearings were an opportunity for parties to discuss the legal and 
policy implications of uncontested facts with an examiner familiar 
with the agency’s policies.30 Even at the NLRB, where the facts 
were often in dispute, supporters argued that the examples 
complained about were mostly routine and unproblematic examples 
of the administrative process at work. 31 A 1940 study of the 
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure reported 
that the NLRB had in fact gone to some trouble to keep their 
examiners as independent as possible, appointing separate trial 
attorneys to represent the NLRB during its hearings and keeping the 
two groups of attorneys apart. 32 The blame, some carefully 
suggested, lay instead with employers hostile to regulation.33 The 
1938 Weirton Steel case illustrated the challenges for NLRB 
27 INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 
23, at 141–47; GROSS, THE RESHAPING, supra note 21.
28 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 21. 
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 20. 
32 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH NO.
18, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 35 (1940).  As of 1939, according to 
Gellhorn and Linfield, “In only one instance has the Board ordered a new hearing 
because of what it found to be improper and prejudicial rulings by the presiding 
Trial Examiner.”  Gellhorn & Linfield, supra note 21, at 360 n.57.  See also
GROSS, THE MAKING, supra note 21; HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN,
FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT–HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR 
POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS (1950); Joanna Grisinger, Law in Action: The 
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 379
(2008). 
33 Gellhorn & Linfield, supra note 21; Madden, The National Labor Relations 
Act, supra note 21.
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examiners facing hostile employers.34 The examiner called out the 
steel company’s counsel for his “defiant, contemptuous and 
contumacious conduct” at the hearing, during which, according to the 
NLRB, counsel pursued “a calculated attempt to wrest control of the 
hearing” from the NLRB examiner.35 When, based on these antics, 
the examiner expelled the attorney from the hearing, a local crowd in 
Steubenville, Ohio, organized a demonstration and hung the 
examiner in effigy.36
Defenders also pointed to a wealth of judicial decisions in 
which such administrative practices had been deemed fair, or at least 
held to provide minimum constitutional standards of due process.37
After all, many administrative procedures had developed defensively, 
as agencies and commissions adopted quasi-judicial procedures to 
demonstrate to reviewing courts that they were not as alien as they
might seem.38 Whereas the Smith Committee charged that the NLRB 
was “most deplorably biased” toward employees, 39 and parties 
appealing NLRB orders routinely blamed examiners for deviating 
from judicial norms, federal judges reviewing administrative hearings
generally dismissed claims of unfairness.40 Weak performances by 
examiners were embarrassing for the agency but not necessarily 
ultimately unfair to the parties, and only in a few cases were board 
members or examiners found so unfair as to convince the reviewing 
court that the NLRB’s decision lacked due process.41 And given that 
examiners did not control the final decision, judges typically 
endorsed agencies’ proceedings even when the initial hearing 
involved practices unlikely to pass muster in the courts. 42 Although 
34 In re Weirton Steel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 581 (1938).
35 Id. at 582, 588.
36 Id. at 588–89; NLRB Will Hear Weirton Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1938, 
at 1; NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 135 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1943). 
37 See infra note 42.
38 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 28.
39 INVESTIGATION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 
23, at pt.1, 149.
40 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 28.
41 See Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 151 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1945); NLRB 
v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1943); Berkshire Emps. Ass’n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 
235 (3d Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Wash. Dehydrated Food Co., 118 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 
1941); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1940); Montgomery Ward & 
Co. v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1939).
42 For cases finding that the NLRB had provided a fair hearing, see NLRB v. 
Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 
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most judges were already convinced that “different” did not 
necessarily mean “unfair” when it came to administrative procedure, 
they were not the only ones who needed convincing.43 Defenders 
U.S. 197 (1938); NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 45 (3d Cir. 
1942); NLRB v. Air Assocs., Inc., 121 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1941); Press Co. v. 
NLRB, 118 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 
(6th Cir. 1940); Consumers Power Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1940); 
Cont’l Box Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1940); Subin v. NLRB, 112 F.2d 
326 (3d Cir. 1940); Cupples Co. Mfrs. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 100, 113 (8th Cir. 
1939); NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 177 (3rd Cir. 1939); 
Jefferson Electric Co. v. NLRB, 102 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1939); NLRB v. Remington 
Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938).  See also Gellhorn & Linfield, supra note 
21.
43 Many administrative procedures had developed defensively, as agencies and 
commissions adopted quasi-judicial procedures to demonstrate to reviewing courts 
that they were not as alien as they might seem. See BD. OF INVESTIGATION &
RESEARCH, REPORT ON PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF GOVERNMENTAL 
CONTROL, 78th Cong., H.R. DOC. NO. 78-678 (2d Sess. 1944); Bernstein, supra 
note 5, at 317–18; LANDIS, supra note 4.  Courts generally upheld agency orders 
when the sufficiency of the facts was in question.  The central question of 
administrative law in earlier decades was whether courts or agencies should have 
the final say over administrative decision-making.  Although courts proved initially 
unwilling to defer to administrators, by the early 1930s courts had developed 
doctrines allowing them to review agencies’ application of law but defer to their 
fact-finding.  Federal courts held most agencies to this standard (for example, 
interpreting language that facts would be conclusive if “supported by evidence” to 
mean that “substantial evidence” was indeed required).  NLRB v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); 
Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); FTC v. Curtis Publ’g 
Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).  For studies of the development of the “substantial 
evidence” standard, see WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND 
THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT (1982); ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE 
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941); J. ROLAND PENNOCK,
ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW (1941); ARI ARTHUR HOOGENBOOM &
OLIVE HOOGENBOOM, A HISTORY OF THE ICC: FROM PANACEA TO PALLIATIVE
(1976); CARL MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1920–1930 (1933); 
SALYER, supra note 2; RICHARD D. STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
COMMISSION AND THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF REGULATORY POLICY 
(1991); White, supra note 2; Rabin, supra note 2; E. Blythe Stason, “Substantial 
Evidence” in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026 (1941); Robert L. Stern, 
Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 
58 HARV. L. REV. 70 (1944); Stewart, supra note 2 (1975); Paul R. Verkuil, The 
Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258 (1978); 
Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist 
History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1991).
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touted their agencies’ legal legitimacy,44 but political legitimacy had
not necessarily followed.
Indeed, critics continued to complain about administrative 
misconduct during the 1930s and 1940s, and, led by the ABA, 
pushed for reform that would bring the administrative state to heel.45
Their proposed code, introduced into Congress in 1939 by 
Representative Francis Walter (D-Pennsylvania) and Senator Marvel 
Mills Logan (D-Kentucky), found the administrative process was not 
nearly enough like the judicial one, and the examiners not nearly 
enough like judges.  In response to these concerns, the ABA 
proposed additional opportunities for both administrators and courts 
to review administrative decisions.  Parties could seek review by: (1) 
new review boards to be created within each agency, ensuring an 
appeal from unfair examiners before the agency’s decision became 
final; and (2) by federal courts with expanded powers of review, 
ensuring an appeal from the agency itself.46 Committees in each 
house of Congress reported favorably on the Walter–Logan Bill, 
44 Clyde B. Aitchison, Reforming the Administrative Process, 7 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 703 (1939); Fahy, supra note 18; Robert E. Freer, Federal Trade Commission 
Procedure, 26 A.B.A. J. 342 (1940); R. E. Freer, Practice Before the Federal 
Trade Commission, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 283 (1939); Gellhorn & Linfield, supra 
note 21; Grisinger, supra note 32; Chester T. Lane & Robert M. Blair-Smith, The 
SEC and the “Expeditious Settlement of Disputes,” 34 ILL. L. REV. 699 (1940); 
Madden, Administrative Procedure, supra note 21; Madden, The National Labor 
Relations Act, supra note 21; Calvert Magruder, Administrative Procedures Under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 25 A.B.A. J. 688 (1939); Ashley Sellers, 
Administrative Procedure—A Suggested Classification of Procedures of 
Regulatory Agencies in the United States Department of Agriculture, 25 WASH. U.
L. Q. 352 (1940); Benedict Wolf, Administrative Procedure Before the National 
Labor Relations Board, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 358 (1938).
45 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 62.
46 On the Walter–Logan Bill, see Louis L. Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in 
Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (1939); Breck P. McAllister, 
Administrative Adjudication and Judicial Review, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 680, 691 (1940).  
See also HORWITZ, supra note 2; SHAMIR, supra note 5; Brazier, supra note 2; 
Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L.
REV. 219 (1986); Walter Gellhorn & Kenneth Culp Davis, Present at the Creation: 
Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511 (1986); Kaufman, supra
note 6; James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law: The Walter-Logan 
Bill, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1940); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & 
Barry R. Weingast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); David H. Rosenbloom, 1946: Framing a Lasting 
Congressional Response to the Administrative State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 173 
(1998); Shepherd, supra note 2; Verkuil, supra note 43; Zeppos, supra note 2.
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suggesting the bill would rein in overzealous bureaucrats whom, the 
House Judiciary Committee warned, “become contemptuous of both 
the Congress and the courts; disregardful of the rights of the 
governed; and for lack of sufficient legal control over them a few 
develop Messiah complexes.”47
Not surprisingly, agencies and their defenders fiercely 
resisted, arguing that turning all adjudications into formal 
adjudications and adding additional steps to the decision-making 
process would slow down the administrative process significantly.48
Indeed, opponents argued that the bill was intended to hinder the 
administration of substantive New Deal policies, and a New York 
Post editorial, entitled A Dull but Dangerous Bill, called the Walter–
Logan Bill “the most subtle attack yet planned on all the social 
reforms of the past seven years.”49
47 H. JUDICIARY COMM., PROVIDING FOR THE MORE EXPEDITIOUS SETTLEMENT 
OF DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, 76th Cong., 
H.R. REP. NO. 76-1149, at 2 (1st Sess. 1939).
48 Mortimer Reimer, Letter to the editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1939, at 22; see 
also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE NATIONAL 
LAWYERS’ GUILD (1939), Folder “National Lawyers Guild,” Box 9, A.G. 
Committee Correspondence, Entry 376, Records of the Attorney General’s 
Committee on Administrative Procedure (AGCAP), General Records of the 
Department of Justice, Record Group (RG) 60, National Archives & Records 
Administration, College Park, MD (NACP); Landis, supra note 46; John Foster 
Dulles, Administrative Law, Address at Langdell Hall, Cambridge 5 (Jan. 14, 
1939).
49 Samuel Grafton, A Dull but Dangerous Bill, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Feb. 
7, 1940, reprinted from [originally in] N.Y. POST, Folder “Legislation—
Administrative Procedure Bills Statements & Articles,” Box 8, A.G. Committee 
Correspondence, Entry 376, AGCAP, RG 60, NACP.
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III. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE
Even as Congress considered the Walter–Logan Bill (which 
ultimately was vetoed by President Roosevelt in December 1940), 
President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Frank Murphy to lead a 
new study of federal administrative procedure. 50 The Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure was staffed with 
prominent attorneys, several of whom—including Solicitor General 
Robert H. Jackson, former Assistant Attorney General Carl 
McFarland, former Undersecretary of the Treasury Dean Acheson, 
and former NLRB chairman Lloyd Garrison—had significant 
administrative experience. 51 The committee and its staff worked 
closely with agencies and practitioners as they compiled twenty-
seven monographs, each describing the operations and procedures of 
individual agencies, bureaus, and departments, and published a 
lengthy final report, issued in January 1941.52 (Carl McFarland, E. 
Blythe Stason, dean of the University of Michigan School of Law, 
and Arthur T. Vanderbilt, a legal reformer and a past president of the 
ABA, issued a separate joint statement disagreeing with several of 
the majority’s points. D. Lawrence Groner, chief judge of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, offered another.)
The Attorney General’s Committee found scant evidence of 
malfeasance by examiners and rebuked claims of lawlessness by 
demonstrating the wealth of multistep procedures for hearings and 
appeals throughout the administrative process.53 Their reports did 
demonstrate that most “formal” hearings were in fact relatively 
informal when compared to courts; parties confronted administrative 
officials not in formal courtrooms but in the agencies’ own offices, in 
50 Letter from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Frank Murphy (Feb. 
16, 1939), reprinted in ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 
FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 252 (1st Sess. 1941).
51 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 66.
52 See also COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPHS OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 76-186 (3d 
Sess. 1940); S. DOC. NO. 77-8.
53 S. DOC. NO. 77-8. For more on the Attorney General’s Committee, see 
ROHR, supra note 2; Brazier, supra note 2; Grisinger, supra note 32; Shepherd, 
supra note 2. 
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space borrowed from other agencies, or in the field.54 At the Federal 
Alcohol Administration, for example, agency representatives 
maintained friendly relationships with parties; they “often address 
each other by their given names when off the record, and frequently 
indulge in bits of facetious asides.”55 Practices were so informal that 
the parties and the examiners often smoked during the hearings, and 
agency officials even “occasionally remove[d] their coats”—weather 
permitting. 56 Surveying these varying models, the committee 
suggested that such informality was not ideal, but became a problem 
only when parties lost respect for the examiners and for the hearing 
process. 57 As the members argued, “fairness does not require a 
particular form of hearing procedure. It does require an open and fair 
atmosphere and a receptive presiding officer.”58
The controversial figure of the hearing examiner thus 
received considerable attention.  In response to critics worried that 
communication between examiners and other agency staffers 
influenced examiners’ decisions, the committee reported that many 
of the more controversial and more powerful agencies, including the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the NLRB, already went to 
some lengths to insulate their personnel.59 The Labor Department’s 
Division of Public Contracts, for example, separated its examiners 
and trial attorneys during travel, even “in places boasting only one 
reasonably comfortable hostelry.”60 In other agencies, the Attorney 
General’s Committee found that having the examiners fully involved 
in agency business was unproblematic; at the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), it had led to “increasingly 
intelligent records.”61 And the USDA’s Grain Division had ended its 
54 See S. DOC. NO. 77-8.
55 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH NO. 5,
FEDERAL ALCOHOL ADMINISTRATION 40 (1940).
56 Id.
57 See S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 69.
58 Id. at 68. 
59 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 69.
60 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH NO. 1,
DIVISION OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE WALSH–HEALEY 
ACT 31 (1939).
61 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH NO. 3,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 23 (1940).  The Federal 
Communications Bar Association, however, questioned this and other staff 
observations.  See SPEC. COMM. OF THE FED. COMMC’NS BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO 
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 8–9 (May 9, 1940), Folder “Attorney General's 
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practice of using one examiner to conduct the hearing and another to 
represent the division in proceedings regarding grain quality 
misrepresentation “because of gibes at the Department for using two 
men where one would suffice.” 62 As the Attorney General’s 
Committee staff reported, “The ‘judge-prosecutor’ complex, beloved 
of lawyers, apparently impresses the grain trade very little if at all.”63
Members recognized, however, that even unfounded charges 
of bias were harmful to an agency’s reputation.64 They concluded 
that formal hearings must be designed with an eye toward reassuring 
the parties before them that the agency’s decision was unbiased.65
Thus, the committee suggested that all agencies fully segregate 
prosecution and adjudication functions.66 The examiners in each 
agency would be hired by an external process, isolated from cases 
before and after the hearing process, and barred from performing 
other administrative tasks.67 Four members of the committee—Carl 
McFarland, Blythe Stason, Arthur Vanderbilt, and Judge D. 
Lawrence Groner—recommended in a separate statement that the 
process of adjudication (and the examiners themselves) be moved 
entirely outside the agencies, to an independent board.68
The Attorney General’s Committee was also concerned with 
examiners’ capacity, having found that the ideal of expert examiners 
contrasted sharply with the reality of passive and ineffective ones.69
Ideally, an examiner’s report would contain the examiner’s factual 
findings and tentative recommendations to the agency heads. 70
However, as Acheson observed, “in almost every agency that we 
have dealt with that had examiners we have run into the decay of the 
Committee on Administrative Procedure, 1939–1941: General [2 of 4],” Box 2, 
Dean G. Acheson Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, 
MO (HSTL). 
62 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPH NO. 7,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GRAIN STANDARDS ACT, DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE 35 (1940).
63 Id.
64 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 68.
65 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO.
77-8, at 68 (1st Sess. 1941).
66 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 70.
67 Id.
68 See S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 209.
69 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 68.
70 Id.
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examiners”; as a result, the initial report “isn’t a report at all, it is just 
a sort of summary of some of the evidence.”71 Even when examiners
did reach conclusions, there was no guarantee of their accuracy.72
Although the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) accepted 
examiners’ recommendations in approximately eight-five percent of 
the cases, the FCC had decided to abolish examiners’ reports entirely 
once it found that commissioners disagreed with examiners in over 
half the cases.73
The Attorney General’s Committee thus recommended 
improving the examiner corps by offering lawyers higher wages, 
fixed terms with removal only for cause, and the more impressive 
title of “hearing commissioners.”74 As the committee concluded, 
once examiners’ work could “carry a hallmark of fairness and 
capacity,” then “a great part of the criticisms of administrative 
agencies will have been met.”75 These new hearing commissioners 
would, Attorney General’s Committee members assumed, be able to 
draft more useful reports; thus, the committee recommended that 
agency heads defer to hearing commissioners’ fact finding unless 
they found clear error.76 In this sense, hearing commissioners were
to become more like trial judges; as the committee stated, “the 
relationship upon appeal between the hearing commissioner and the 
agency ought to a considerable extent to be that of trial court to 
appellate court.”77 However, the committee was quick to emphasize 
that the ultimate decision in any case always remained with the 
agency heads, and “[c]onclusions, interpretations, law, and policy 
should, of course, be open to full review” by the agency.78
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946
Political pressure on Congress to do something about the 
agencies only increased in following years, especially as the wartime 
71 Dean G. Acheson, Transcript of the Conference of the Attorney General’s 
Committee, 43 (Feb. 24, 1940), Folder “Committee Meeting Feb. 24th & 25th,” 
Box 4, A.G. Committee Correspondence, Entry 376, AGCAP, RG 60, NACP.
72 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 69.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 43–44.
76 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 69.
77 S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 51.
78 Id.
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experience with bureaucracy failed to comfort Americans already 
suspicious of administration.79 Bureaucrats at the Office of Price
Administration (OPA), in particular, were charged with usurping and 
abusing power as they exercised their price control and rationing 
authority. 80 Critics slammed the OPA’s “pseudo judiciary” of 
79 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 68 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 249, 250 (1943).  For studies of the OPA and other wartime agencies, see 
AMY BENTLEY, EATING FOR VICTORY: FOOD RATIONING AND THE POLITICS OF 
DOMESTICITY (1998); JOHN MORTON BLUM, V WAS FOR VICTORY: POLITICS AND 
AMERICAN CULTURE DURING WORLD WAR II (1976); BRINKLEY, THE END OF 
REFORM, supra note 2; COHEN, supra note 2; Schiller, Reining in the 
Administrative State, supra note 2; JACOBS, supra note 2; RICHARD POLENBERG, 
WAR AND SOCIETY: THE UNITED STATES, 1941–1945 (1972); Andrew H. Bartels, 
The Office of Price Administration and the Legacy of the New Deal, 1939–1946, 
PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1983, at 5.
80 On the operations of the OPA, see BAR ASS’N OF S.F., COMMITTEE REPORT 
ON OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OF THE OFFICE OF PRICE 
ADMINISTRATION (1943); Harold Leventhal, Part II: The Role of the Price 
Lawyers, in NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON & HAROLD LEVENTHAL, OFFICE OF 
TEMPORARY CONTROLS, OFFICE OF PRICE ADMIN., PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL:
LEGAL PHASES, 49 (1947); HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, A SHORT HISTORY OF OPA
(1948); VICTOR A. THOMPSON, THE REGULATORY PROCESS IN OPA RATIONING
(1950); OFFICE OF PRICE ADMIN., RATIONING, WHY AND HOW (1942); Joseph W. 
Aidlin, The Constitutionality of the 1942 Price Control Act, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 648 
(1942); Chester Bowles, OPA Volunteers: Big Democracy in Action, 5 PUB.
ADMIN. R. 350 (1945); Arthur L. Brown, The Office of Administrative Hearings, 29 
CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1944); Samuel D. Estep et al., Comment, 41 MICH. L. REV.
109 (1942); Richard H. Field Jr., Rationing Suspension Orders: A Reply to Dean 
Pound, 30 A.B.A. J. 385 (1944); David Ginsburg, Legal Aspects of Price Control 
in the Defense Program, 27 A.B.A. J. 527 (1941); David Ginsburg, The Emergency 
Price Control Act of 1942: Basic Authority and Sanctions, 9 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 22 (1942); Joseph E. Goodbar, Administrative Agency in Action, 25 B.U. L.
REV. 185 (1945); Leon Henderson, A Preface to Price Control, 9 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1942); Donald D. Holdoegel, The War Powers and the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 29 IOWA L. REV. 454 (1944); Elmo B. 
Hunter, The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 10 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 129 
(1942); John F. McCarthy, Aspects of Federal Rent Control, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 68 
(1945); Carl Henry Monsees, Industry Advisory Committees in the War Agencies, 3 
PUB. ADMIN. R. 254 (1943); Henry S. Reuss, The Lawyer in the OPA, 10 AM. L.
SCH. REV. 23 (1942); Sylvester C. Smith Jr., Comment on Mr. Field’s Reply for the 
OPA, 30 A.B.A. J. 390 (1944); Robert A. Sprecher, Price Control in the Courts, 44 
COLUM. L. REV. 34 (1944); Charles W. Stewart Jr., The Emergency Court of 
Appeals: Interpretation of Procedure and Judicial Review Under the Price Control 
Act, 32 GA. L. REV. 42 (1943); William R. Bandy, Comment, Notice and 
Opportunity to Be Heard in Price Control Proceedings, 20 TEX. L. REV. 577
(1942).  
                                                 
Spring 2014 The Hearing Examiners 21
hearing commissioners, and attacked the combination of prosecution 
and judicial powers in their hearings.81 Here, too, cries of unfairness 
linked fairness to legality, and framed anti-bureaucratic politics 
around the need for procedural reform. 
The combination of New Deal debates and wartime concerns 
about the dangers of administrative power were reflected in the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, the first broad procedural 
statute for the administrative state.82 The APA—passed without a 
recorded vote and signed into law on June 11, 1946—was touted by 
Senator Pat McCarran as “a bill of rights for the hundreds of 
thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in 
one way or another by agencies of the Federal Government.”83 As 
Kenneth Culp Davis, an active participant in these debates, 
concluded forty years later, the APA’s “considerable 
For examples of criticism, see Brand Names and Newsprint, Part 1: 
Hearings Before the United States House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 78th Cong. (1943); H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE,
78TH CONG., BRAND NAMES AND NEWSPRINT: INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON BRAND NAMES AND 
NEWSPRINT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, PT. 1,
H.R. REP. NO. 78-808 (1st Sess.1943); H. SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE EXEC.
AGENCIES, 78TH CONG., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO 
INVESTIGATE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, PT. 1 (1st Sess. 1943); H. SELECT COMM. TO 
INVESTIGATE EXEC. AGENCIES BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY, 78TH 
CONG., INVESTIGATING EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, H. REP. 69 (1st Sess. 1943); H.
SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE EXEC. AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES: SECOND INTERMEDIATE 
REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, H.R.
REP. NO. 78-862 (1st Sess. 1943).  See also Ralph K. Huitt, The Congressional 
Committee: A Case Study, 48 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 340 (1954).
81 H.R. REP. NO. 78-862, at 14, 3.
82 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012)).  For studies of the 
APA, see VERKUIL, supra note 43; Gellhorn, supra note 46; SHAMIR, supra note 5; 
Gellhorn & Davis, supra note 46; Shepherd, supra note 2; Brazier, supra note 2; 
Zeppos, supra note 2; Rosenbloom, supra note 46; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast 
supra note 46.
83 See Administrative Procedure Act: Proceedings in the H.R. May 24 and 25, 
1956 and Proceedings in the S. of the U.S. March 12 and May 27, 1956 on S.7, S. 
Judiciary Comm., 79th Cong. (1946) [hereinafter Admin. Procedure Act: 
Proceedings] (statement of Sen. Pat McCarran, Mar. 12, 1946), reprinted in
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 298 (1946), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl79-
404/proceedings-05-1946.pdf.  
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accomplishment” was in fact “much more political than legal.”84
Although the ABA and Congress used the act to trumpet the fact that 
due process had been brought to the administrative state, 
administrative law professor Bernard Schwartz suggested that the 
APA “is not revolutionary” but instead “adopts, in large measure, the 
best existing administrative practice.”85 In reality, much of the APA 
was an explicit statement of best practices that effectively indicated 
Congress’s approval of the administrative state.86 The ABA had 
pulled back from the restrictive approach it espoused in the Walter–
Logan Bill;87 indeed, the APA was intentionally broad and flexible, 
and was designed to encompass the vast variation in administrative 
tasks and methods.88 Carl McFarland described it to Congress as a 
“skeleton, upon which administrative agencies may adopt their own 
rules of procedure”; 89 the Senate Judiciary Committee similarly 
described it as “an outline of minimum basic essentials” rather than a 
prescriptive code. 90 As one observer noted, some critics were 
disappointed that the APA was “a gentle slap on the bureaucratic 
wrist when they would prefer a kick in the bureaucratic buttock.” 91
84 Gellhorn & Davis, supra note 46, at 518.  Marver Bernstein agreed, 
remarking in 1954 that the APA was “more important for its political implications 
than for its specific procedural requirements and definitions.”  Bernstein, supra
note 5, at 304.  See also HOLDEN JR., supra note 2; MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 
32, at 63–64; MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988); White, supra note 2, at 94–127; Verkuil, 
supra note 43; Rabin, supra note 2; Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 
VA. L. REV. 447 (1986).
85 Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Procedure and the A.P.A., 24 N.Y.U. L.
Q. REV. 514, 514 (1949).
86 See Ashley Sellers, Carl McFarland—The Architect of the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act, VA. J. INT’L L. 12, 16–17 (1975). 
87 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 74.
88 Id. at 77.
89 Administrative Procedure: Hearing on H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R. 1117, H.R.
1203, H.R. 1206, and H.R. 2602 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong.
(1945) (statement of Carl McFarland), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 72 (1946), available at
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl79-404/hear-19-1945.pdf.
90 S. JUDICIARY COMM., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 79TH CONG., S.
REP. NO. 752, at 7 (1st Sess. 1945); see also Admin. Procedure Act: Proceedings, 
supra note 83, at 304.
91 Alfred Long Scanlan, Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act—In Which Judicial Offspring Receive a Congressional Confirmation, 23 
NOTRE DAME L. 501, 503 (1948).
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Most agencies and commissions already adhered to judicially defined 
standards of due process and employed quasi-judicial procedures in 
their work, a result of years of agencies scrambling to satisfy 
reviewing courts and prove their fairness to the public.92 To the 
extent that the APA was, in fact, a “judicialized” conception of the 
administrative state, such standards came largely from the doctrines 
of administrative law created and articulated by the courts over the 
past six decades, rather than the new law itself.93 By 1948, the 
outgoing president of the ICC Practitioners’ Association observed 
that “everyone interested is still searching in vain for some profound 
effect it has had upon practice before the Commission.”94
The APA’s most significant reforms were those related to the 
examiners and to the formal hearings they conducted. 95 If the 
problem of the administrative state was administrative officials who 
acted recklessly in resolving private parties’ property interests, the 
APA’s solution was fairer hearings for parties challenging agency 
action.  Examiners were not renamed hearing commissioners, but 
their separate role within the agency was clarified and codified.96
Examiners could no longer be supervised by any administrative 
official “engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions,” and they themselves could “perform no duties 
inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as examiners,” thus 
putting an end to examiners wearing many hats in an agency. 97
Examiners were also barred from consulting “any person or party on 
any fact in issue” in a particular case without offering all parties an 
opportunity to participate, and were to draft their initial decisions 
without consultation with others in the agency.98 Examiners were to 
be more isolated from outside influences and from the rest of the 
agency (as was already the practice at many of the most powerful 
agencies), shielding them from pressure to decide in a particular 
92 Id.
93 Id. at 545–46.
94 Harry C. Ames, I.C.C. View of Procedure Act, 16 I.C.C. PRACTICIONERS’ J.
218–19 (1948), as reprinted in 1 ADMIN. L. BULL. 2, 2 (1949).
95 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 79.
96 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 
(1946).
97 See id. §§ 5(c), 11.  
98 Id. § 5(c).
                                                 
24 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-1
manner and reassuring parties that the person hearing their side of the 
story was more like a neutral arbiter than a regular agency staffer.99
By deeming examiners’ conversations with fellow agency 
staffers improper, the APA appeared to impose a quite strict 
segregation of functions that would make agencies’ operations more 
like those of courts, and significantly change administrative practice 
for those agencies that did not already draw clear lines in this area.100
These strict requirements were soon watered down, however, as the 
Justice Department’s 1947 Attorney General’s Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act—an interpretive guide for agencies 
wondering how to comply with the APA—suggested that the statute 
could not logically have meant to keep an examiner away from his 
agency’s collective expertise.101 According to Attorney General Tom 
Clark, the examiner was barred from communications with the 
prosecutors, but he was free to request help from staffers “not 
engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions in that or a 
factually related case.”102 This interpretation brought the APA in line 
with much existing agency practice.103
To be sure, examiners became a little more like judges under 
the Act.104 Examiners were given new authority to command the 
hearing and to respond to objections—making certain, as the Senate 
Judiciary Committee put it, “that the presiding officer will perform a 
real function rather than serve merely as a notary or policeman.”105
The examiners’ ability to dictate the agency’s final decision remained 
limited, however.106 The Act adopted the recommendation of the 
Attorney General’s Committee that the examiner’s proposed decision 
should stand unless the regulated parties or the agency appealed; 
99 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 79.
100 Id.
101 See TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 55 (1947).
102 Id.; see also NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, 133 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1943).
103 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 80.
104 Id.
105 S. JUDICIARY COMM., ADIMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. REP. NO. 79-
752, at 207 (1945), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl79-404/senaterept-752-
1945.pdf.
106 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 80.
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however, on appeal, the agency appeared free to take over the case 
and go through the whole file themselves.107
The precise role of the examiner’s report was at issue in 
Universal Camera v. NLRB, 108 an early Supreme Court case 
examining the changes the APA had wrought.  In this case, involving 
an NLRB reinstatement order, the Board had rejected its examiner’s 
conclusions in crafting its order.109 In the 1947 Labor-Management 
Relations Act (Taft–Hartley Act), passed by a newly conservative 
Congress to limit the NLRB’s authority, Congress followed the APA 
and changed the standard of review from a de facto “substantial 
evidence” standard to one of “substantial evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.” 110 At issue was whether this was a 
significant change; the Court decided that it was.111 As Justice Felix 
Frankfurter explained, in changing the statutory standards, “Congress 
expressed a mood.”112 This “mood” reflected “pressures for stricter 
and more uniform practice, not a reflection of approval of all existing 
practices.”113
Also at issue was the role of the examiner’s report.114 The 
Second Circuit struggled to decide how much weight to give the 
107 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 8(a).
108 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
109 See id. at 491.
110 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
141–144, 61 Stat. 136 (2012).  In the Taft–Hartley Act, Congress created a 
powerful general counsel, independent of the NLRB, to take charge of the board’s 
investigation and prosecution functions, and replaced the three-man board with five 
members focused entirely on quasi-judicial duties (and thus essentially acting as 
hearing examiners).  See MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 32; JAMES A. GROSS,
BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–
1994 (1995); GROSS, THE RESHAPING, supra note 21; CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS,
THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED 
LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960 (1985); Robert N. Denham, The Taft-
Hartley Act, 20 TENN. L. REV. 168 (1948).
111 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 491.
112 Id. at 487; KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 925–28 (1951).
113 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 489.  See Raymond L. Britton, Changes in 
Organization and Procedures of the NLRB, 5 SW. L.J. 226 (1951); Seymour Scher, 
The Politics of Agency Organization, 15 W. POL. Q. 328 (1962); Louis R. Gilbert, 
Comment, Administrative Law—“Review of Whole Record” in Determining 
Substantiality of Evidence to Sustain Administrative Board’s Finding, 35 MARQ. L.
REV. 361 (1952).
114 See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 491–97; NLRB v. Universal Camera 
Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 752–53 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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examiner’s findings rejected by the Board.115 Judge Learned Hand 
pointed out that the examiner’s proximity to oral and written 
evidence gave him a distinct advantage, “and it is principally on that 
account that upon an appeal from the judgment of a district court, a 
court of appeals will hesitate to reverse.”116 Looking at the Wagner 
Act, the Taft–Hartley Act, and the APA, however, Judge Hand 
rejected the analogy of the examiner as a district court judge, and 
declined to find that the NLRB was bound by the examiner’s
conclusions.117 Judge Hand stated that “although the Board would be 
wrong in totally disregarding his findings, it is practically impossible 
for a court, upon review of those findings which the Board itself 
substitutes, to consider the Board’s reversal as a factor in the court’s
own decision.”118
In determining whether courts should accord more weight to 
examiners’ views than they had previously, the Supreme Court 
looked hard at the history of procedural reform, particularly the work 
of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative 
Procedure.119 Unlike the court below, the Court suggested that the 
examiners’ findings were relevant as part of the “whole record” on 
review, given “the indications in the legislative history that 
enhancement of the status and function of the trial examiner was one 
of the important purposes of the movement for administrative 
reform.” 120 Although the APA had not codified the Attorney 
General’s Committee recommendation that the agencies take the 
examiners’ findings more seriously,
[T]his refusal to make mandatory the 
recommendations of the Attorney General’s
Committee should not be construed as a repudiation of 
them. Nothing in the statutes suggests that the Labor 
Board should not be influenced by the examiner’s
opportunity to observe the witnesses he hears and sees 
and the Board does not. Nothing suggests that 
reviewing courts should not give to the examiner’s
115 Universal Camera, 179 F.2d at 752–53.
116 Id. at 752.
117 Id. at 752–54.
118 Id. at 753.
119 Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477–97.
120 Id. at 488, 493–94.
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report such probative force as it intrinsically 
commands. 121
Plenty of discretion remained for the agency, however.  To 
require the agency to be bound by the examiner’s findings “would 
make so drastic a departure from prior administrative practice that 
explicitness would be required.”122 And even under review on the 
“whole record,” the examiner’s report was only one part of the 
record. 123 The examiners—awkwardly described by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee as “semi-independent subordinate hearing 
officers”—thus remained within the agency’s control.124
V. IMPLEMENTING THE APA’S HEARING EXAMINER PROVISIONS
The APA also attempted to improve the quality of hearing 
examiners, addressing the findings of the Attorney General’s 
Committee that the sitting hearing examiners were not as competent 
as one might hope.  The APA moved to attract such men and women 
by giving them a more important role and raising their salaries.125 In 
addition, responsibility for examiners’ hiring, firing, and promotion 
was moved to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), in the hope that 
examiners might render more “objective” decisions once freed from 
the possibility of retaliation.126 And although examiners were still 
121 Id. at 495.  Thus, agencies were to consider examiners’ reports on a case-
by-case basis as they evaluated the substantiality of the evidence, and consider that
[E]vidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when
an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the 
witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different 
from the Board's than when he has reached the same conclusion.  
The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with the 
consistency and inherent probability of testimony.
Id. at 496.
122 Id. at 492.
123 Id. at 496.
124 See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953); 
see S. JUDICIARY COMM., ADIMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. REP. NO. 79-752, 
at 192 (1945).
125 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 11; see also Lloyd Musolf, 
Administrative Law Judges: A 1948 Snapshot, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 257 (1994). 
126 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 11.
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administrative officers, lacking the life tenure of federal judges, the 
APA made them more independent than their fellow staffers by 
barring their firing for any reason other than “good cause” as found 
by the CSC.127
However, the government’s efforts to comply with these 
seemingly straightforward provisions quickly erupted into 
controversy.128 When the CSC began its efforts to hire new hearing 
examiners, it had to confront an obvious question: What should they 
do with the 350 men and women already holding these positions?129
Simply reappointing the existing examiners to newly enhanced roles 
seemed to confound the goal of improving staffing; on the other 
hand, starting fresh with untrained examiners would have thrown the 
agencies into chaos.130 The CSC split the difference.131 Soon after 
the APA took effect in July 1947, the CSC issued regulations setting 
forth the qualifications for both new hearing examiners and those 
already in place.132 It assembled a group of lawyers from outside the 
CSC to serve on a Board of Examiners in charge of evaluating the 
hearing examiners; the CSC suggested it would reappoint only those 
who their consultants found, per the APA, to be “qualified and 
competent” to perform their duties.133
Early in the board’s work, Chairman Carl McFarland wrote to 
select members of Congress wondering “how far we may go—as a 
127 See id.; Bernstein, supra note 5, at 313.
128 On the “hearing examiner controversy,” see Bernstein, supra note 5, at 
306–08; Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 63 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1950); Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Officer 
Problem—Symptom and Symbol, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 281 (1955); Daniel J. Gifford, 
Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future 
Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Chester T. Lane, Book Review, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 1008 (1954) (reviewing LLOYD D. MUSOLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS 
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (1953)); Note, Hearing 
Examiner Status: A Recurrent Problem in Administrative Law, 30 IND. L.J. 86
(1954) [hereinafter Hearing Examiner Status]; John W. Macy, Jr., The APA and the 
Hearing Examiner: Products of a Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351 (1967); 
Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (1979); Morgan 
Thomas, The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners: Pressure Groups and the 
Administrative Process, 59 YALE L.J. 431 (1949).
129 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 92.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 11.
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practical matter—in weeding out the incompetent and unfit.” 134
Given the vagueness of the APA’s “qualified and competent”
standard, the board had a great deal of discretion in deciding who to 
retain and what to consider in making that determination.135 On the 
basis of agency records and oral interviews, members looked for 
professional legal experience and specialized administrative 
experience of those before them.136 As McFarland put it, the board’s 
duty was to “make sure that every examiner who is to be retained is 
mentally and temperamentally equipped to be what federal judges 
ought to be.” 137 This preference for legal over administrative 
expertise was not surprising—with the exception of McFarland, few 
of the board members were experts in administration, but several 
(McFarland included) had strong connections to the conservative 
ABA.138 The board’s desire to judge administrative officials by the 
standards of judicial officers was problematic from the agencies’ 
perspective, however. 139 By discounting the benefits of 
specialization and ignoring the APA’s clear endorsement of non-
courtroom methods, the board adopted a different view of “apt” and 
“able” for the agencies than the agencies had adopted for 
themselves.140
Board members were also troubled about the political 
preferences of the current examiners.141 They evaluated examiners 
on their “general ability to act independently, objectively, efficiently, 
and fairly,”142 and the CSC noted that the decision to review and set 
134 Letter from Carl McFarland, Chairman, Civil Serv. Comm’n Hearing 
Exam’r Bd., to Sen. Pat McCarran (Feb. 2, 1948), Folder “CSC: Congress,” Box 5, 
Carl McFarland Papers, Mss 85–3 (McFarland Papers), Special Collections, 
University of Virginia Law Library (UVA). Similar letters were also sent to 
Representative Walter, Representative John W. Gwynne, and Senator Alexander 
Wiley.
135 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 93.
136 Id.
137 Letter from Carl McFarland, supra note 134.
138 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 93.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 93–94.
142 ADMIN. LAW SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, FIRST REPORT OF THE 
CONSULTANTS TO THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEARING 
EXAMINER PERSONNEL UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, METHOD 
OF RATING APPLICANTS 9 (Jan. 31, 1949) [hereinafter FIRST REPORT OF THE 
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standards for all hearing examiners was intended to avoid charges 
“that hearing examiners are ‘hand picked’ by the agency and may be 
biased in favor of the agency.”143 This echoed the ABA’s concerns 
that simply reappointing the examiners would entrench the agencies’ 
own positions. 144 Pushing for hearing examiners “free from 
preconceptions and political motivations or ideologies,” the ABA 
insisted that such objectivity was “the core of the distinction between 
the American system and the Soviet concept of judicial bodies.”145
Indeed, existing skepticism about the hearing examiners was easily 
combined with developing concerns about allegedly subversive 
officials.146 One former ABA president complained that many of the 
sitting hearing examiners “were ‘hatchet men’ for Left Wing 
ideologies or New Deal philosophies against business,”147 and Senate 
Judiciary Committee chairman Alexander Wiley (R-Wisconsin) 
asked the CSC to ensure that the new examiners “not be men of 
leftist thinking, men who don’t have complete loyalty to our 
constitutional system of checks and balances, men who are not 
CONSULTANTS], Folder “Administrative Procedure Act, Proposed Legislation—
Senatorial,” Box 21, J. Howard McGrath Papers, HSTL.
143 U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, 65TH ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 81-13 
(1948); see also Ralph N. Kleps, Book Review, 37 CAL. L. REV. 534 (1949) 
(reviewing FIRST REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS, supra note 142).
144 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 94.
145 Editorial, Impartiality Is Essential, 33 A.B.A. J. 148 (1947).
146 In an ironic turn, provisions protecting examiners from retribution by their 
agencies made them harder to remove on grounds of disloyalty.  The APA required 
that the CSC fire examiners only on the basis of “good cause,” after a hearing and 
full disclosure of evidence; to the CSC’s consternation, this conflicted with the 
loyalty-security program’s less rigorous standards and, given the evidentiary 
requirements, it would be much more difficult to remove subversive examiners 
than to remove other bureaucrats with less authority and discretion.  Bernstein, 
supra note 5, at 313–14, 317.  See also John D. Morris, U.S. Examiner Held 
Immune to Ouster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1951, at 14.  The CSC worked out 
separate procedures early on.  See Memorandum No. 15 from Seth Richardson, 
Chairman, Loyalty Review Bd. to All Departments and Agencies (July 23, 1948), 
Folder “Memoranda to All Executive Departments and Agencies, No. 1–No. 57,” 
Box 10, Records Relating to Loyalty Review Boards, 1947–1952, A1, Entry 1011, 
Records of the Loyalty Review Board, Records of the Civil Service Commission, 
Record Group 146, NACP. 
147 Memorandum from William L. Ransom, Former President, Am. Bar Ass’n,
to Hoover Comm’n 5 (Mar. 18, 1948), Folder “Regulatory Agencies,
Correspondence Relating to Task Forces, 1947–1949,” NC 115, Entry 11, Box 15, 
Records of the Office of the Executive Director, Records of the Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Record Group 264, NACP.
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devoted to our system of private enterprise; but rather men of 
outstanding judicial temperament, who are unalterably dedicated to 
the preservation of the American Way.”148 The same reformers who 
wanted the hearing examiners to be more independent were 
nonetheless adamant that these hearing examiners not be made more 
independent. 
When the board concluded its review in early 1949, the 
results were striking.  Of the 148 incumbent hearing examiners with 
civil service protection, only 106 were found “qualified for 
permanent and unconditional appointment.”149 Although the CSC 
trumpeted the fact that seventy percent of sitting hearing examiners 
were found qualified,150 this meant, of course, that a substantial 
number of those who had long been serving as examiners were 
deemed unqualified to continue doing so. Anticipating criticism, the 
board emphasized that “only a handful” of these low ratings resulted 
from examiners’ “bias, prejudice, or lack of objectively judicial 
temperament.”151 Most disqualifications, they claimed, were instead 
attributable to examiners’ lack of experience or “abilities indubitably 
very mediocre at best.”152 Other groups of examiners fared similarly 
poorly; twelve of the sixty-nine sitting examiners without civil 
service status were found wholly unqualified, and many of the rest 
met with only grudging approval.153
Examiners, agencies, and the press were skeptical of this 
argument, pointing out that many of those deemed unqualified had 
already amassed years of expertise.154 The Association of Interstate 
Commerce Commission Practitioners protested that the order was 
“extremely unfair because certain men have been disqualified whom 
we all know to be eminently qualified for this position.”155 The 
NLRB similarly complained that the firings had “eviscerated the 
148 Letter from Sen. Alexander Wiley, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm., to 
Arthur S. Flemming, Comm’r, U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n (Apr. 5, 1947), reprinted 
in 33 A.B.A. J. 421, 422 (1947).
149 FIRST REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS, supra note 142, at 18, Table I.
150 CSC Press Release (Mar. 9, 1949) (for release Mar. 11), Folder “CSC: 
Regulations, Releases, General Statements,” Box 5, McFarland Papers, UVA.  
151 FIRST REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS, supra note 142, at 17.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 18, Table II.
154 See infra notes 155–157 and accompanying text. 
155 Public Hearing Asked on Ousted Examiners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1949, at 
4 (quoting Association of Interstate Commerce Commission Practisioners).
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hearing examiner staff.”156 The agencies and the press jumped on the 
figures, and demonstrated that certain agencies were particularly 
affected; twelve of the ICC’s forty-eight examiners were deemed 
unqualified, and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had ten of their 
thirty examiners so designated.157 The greatest damage occurred at 
the NLRB, where almost half of the examiners, many of whom were 
long-time employees, were marked unqualified.158
The disqualified examiners and their agencies quickly 
challenged the board’s findings, questioning both the substantive 
tests the board had used to evaluate them and the procedures by
which the board had done so. 159 The Federal Trial Examiners’ 
Conference rejected allegations of examiner inefficiency, arguing 
that the board should consider the “the importance, complexity and 
magnitude of each case handled” as part of an examiner’s 
assessment.160 Examiners also pointed out that the board’s cavalier 
approach to rating the examiners and its use of confidential sources 
violated the very rules the CSC had created to ensure the APA’s 
stronger removal provisions—regulations that required notice of the 
charges against them, opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and a 
decision made “on the basis of the record of the hearing.”161 The 
Association of Interstate Commerce Commission Practitioners found 
the process “subversive of constitutional guarantees and democratic 
principles and ideals” and complained of the damage to examiners’ 
“professional standing (in the sunset of life devoted to public 
service), social and professional reputation, and the very livelihood” 
without procedural protections.162
The CSC quickly retreated from its board’s findings, 
announced that it would allow the hearing examiners rated ineligible 
156 NLRB Says It Needs Rejected Examiners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1949, at 2.
157 Appeals Granted “Unfit” Examiners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1949, at 2.
158 Joseph A. Loftus, 15 NLRB Examiners Found Unqualified, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 1949, at 1, 20. 
159 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 96.
160 J. FRED JOHNSON JR., RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE FEDERAL TRIAL 
EXAM’RS CONFERENCE 2 (Mar. 31, 1949), Folder “CSC: Rating Factors,” Box 5, 
McFarland Papers, UVA.
161 Appointment, Compensation, and Removal of Hearing Examiners, 12 Fed. 
Reg. 6321, 6324 (Sept. 23, 1947).
162 Jerry Kluttz, The Federal Diary, WASH. POST , May 23, 1949, at B1 
(quoting statements of Ass’n of Interstate Commerce Comm’n Practitioners to 
Congress).
                                                 
Spring 2014 The Hearing Examiners 33
to appeal and to retain their positions while they did so, and rebuked 
the board for its overly strict approach.163 CSC president Harry 
Mitchell suggested to McFarland that the board (which had used the 
standard of “eminently qualified” rather than the APA’s “qualified 
and competent”) “should adopt a more liberal view” when it 
reconsidered its ratings.164 By late 1949, the CSC had capitulated
entirely, permanently reappointing almost all of the sitting examiners 
and starting from scratch to promulgate regulations for hiring and 
firing the examiners in accordance with the APA. 165 Only one 
incumbent examiner with civil service status was ultimately let go.166
When the CSC finally did propose new regulations for hiring 
and firing examiners in the fall of 1951, it had to grapple once again 
with the APA’s vision of examiner independence.  Along with 
regulations regarding hiring, promoting, and firing examiners, the 
CSC adopted the practice of sorting examiners into different grades, 
each with different responsibilities and salaries.167 This practice, in 
which examiners were assigned cases based on their difficulty, had 
been common in the agencies, but came in for significant heat from 
those who feared an agency could rig the system to ensure certain 
cases went to certain examiners.168 Senator McCarran criticized this 
provision, arguing that under the APA “all examiners should be 
superior,” and suggesting that the CSC had created “a nefarious 
promotion scheme” that “leaves to the agency the initiative and the 
control.”169 Such regulations were contrary to McCarran’s vision of 
functionally independent examiners who were to “be very nearly the 
163 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 96.
164 Letter from Harry B. Mitchell, President, U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n to Carl 
McFarland, Chairman, Civil Serv. Comm’n Hearing Exam’r Bd. (May 4, 1949), 
Folder “CSC: Rating Factors,” Box 5, McFarland Papers, UVA.
165 See Appointment, Compensation, and Removal of Hearing Examiners, 16 
Fed. Reg. 9623 (Sept. 21, 1951).
166 WILBER R. LESTER, COMM. ON HEARING OFFICERS, APPOINTMENT AND 
STATUS OF FEDERAL HEARING OFFICERS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S
CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 14 (1954). 
167 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 97.
168 Id.
169 Sen. Pat McCarran to Robert C. Ramspeck (Sept. 6, 1951), reprinted in S.
DOC. 82, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 82ND CONG., HEARING EXAMINER
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 10 (1st Sess. 1951); see also Bernstein, supra note 5, at 308–12.
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equivalent of judges even though operating within the Federal system 
of administrative justice.”170
The Federal Trial Examiners Conference contested the 
regulations in court, on the grounds that the provisions would stymie 
examiners’ independence and thwart the APA. 171 The Supreme 
Court, however, found that courts should not overstate the 
importance of examiner independence in the APA, and resisted the 
urge to adopt a highly judicialized conception of the examiner’s role, 
recognizing that agencies should take examiners’ skill and expertise 
into account in assigning cases.172 The majority of the Court found 
that the regulations did not conflict with the history of administrative 
reform generally, or the APA specifically—a history in which 
Congress intended to make hearing examiners at least “semi-” or 
“partially” independent of the agencies in which they heard cases.173
Dissenting justices warned that the provisions assigning cases by 
rank “are so nebulous that the head of an agency is left practically 
free to select any examiner he chooses for any case he chooses,”174
but the majority found that examiners were still decisively agency 
employees rather than judges on loan to the administrative process.175
McCarran’s subsequent proposal to have the president appoint the 
examiners and to subject them “to the canons and standards of 
conduct applicable to members of the Federal Judiciary” failed to 
catch on, reflecting some limits of this path of reform.176
VI. THE 1950S AND THE RISE OF THE “CAPTURE CRITIQUE”
 
During the 1950s, hostility to bureaucrats—and particularly to 
hearing examiners—did not fade away.  During the 1952 campaign 
season, Republicans (echoing the Declaration of Independence) 
suggested that Democrats had “violated our liberties by turning loose 
upon the country a swarm of arrogant bureaucrats and their agents 
who meddle intolerably in the lives and occupations of our 
170 S. DOC. 82, at 9.
171 See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
172 See id. at 135–43.
173 Id. at 131, 132, 143.
174 Id. at 145 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Bernard Schwartz, Administrative 
Law, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 108–12 (1954); Bernstein, supra note 5, at 311–12.
175 See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 578 n.9.
176 PATRICK ANTHONY MCCARRAN, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT OF TRIAL 
EXAMINERS, S. REP. NO. 83-2199, at 4 (2d Sess. 1954); Fuchs, supra note 128. 
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citizens.” 177 However, it was obvious that the character of this 
hostility was changing.  Having trumpeted the APA’s achievements, 
critics found it difficult to argue that the agencies and examiners 
continued to run roughshod over individual rights.  As observers 
increasingly pointed out, the last thing the administrative process 
needed was more formality or slower administration (the likely 
result, they claimed, of proposals to further separate the examiners).
Instead, many complained, the agencies and commissions were not 
regulating enough.
Workloads kept rising but congressional appropriations did 
not, and agencies’ reliance on policymaking through case-by-case 
adjudication proved increasingly inefficient.178 The Administrative 
Conference of 1953, called by President Eisenhower, focused on the 
delay and inefficiency of formal hearings rather than the alleged 
lawless discretion of hearing examiners. 179 The Administrative 
Conference declined to make significant changes to the existing 
hearing examiner system, finding the hearing examiners “generally 
competent” and the administration of the current system “essentially 
sound.”180 Members reaffirmed their commitment to the examiner 
removal procedures provided by the APA, noting that even though 
complaints against the examiners were legion, no hearing examiners 
had actually been removed under the statute. 181 And in several 
different critiques of administrative governance written in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, observers painted a picture of tortoise-like 
regulatory agencies hamstrung by procedural requirements, moving 
177 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1952, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1952, at 8.
178 For more on case-by-case adjudication, see supra note 121; infra notes 
183–187 and accompanying text.
179 See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CALLED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1953) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE], available at
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1953_0429_Report%20of%20th
e%20Conference%20on%20Administrative%20Procedure.pdf.
180 Id. at 59.  See also EARL W. KINTNER, COMM. ON HEARING OFFICERS,
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE APPOINTMENT AND STATUS OF FEDERAL HEARING 
OFFICERS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT’S CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE (1954); LESTER, supra note 166; Fuchs, supra note 128; Hearing 
Examiner Status, supra note 128.
181 REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 
181, at 66–67.
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very slowly in their own work and quick to retract into their shells to 
avoid conflict.182
To protect themselves from attack, political scientist Marver 
Bernstein argued in a famous 1955 book that administrators chose the 
safest procedures for policymaking—namely, case-by-case 
adjudication.183 With little political support and facing likely legal 
challenges to any action, commissions adopted what they saw as the 
safest path. 184 They declined to act unless necessary, and then 
accumulated mountains of evidence and proceeded though 
judicialized methods that would stand up in court.185 Case-by-case 
policymaking was conservative, incremental, easily reversible, and 
unlikely to offend the entire industry at once.186 This was not the 
courts’ fault; judges had repeatedly endorsed flexible procedural due 
process standards.187 Nor did Bernstein blame the APA, which had 
preserved administrative discretion and adopted existing procedures 
as a model. Instead, he laid the blame on the commissions 
themselves, where commissioners attempted “to acquire the 
respectability and social acceptability achieved by the courts” by 
adopting procedures mimicking judicial ones. 188 Administrative 
formality, unfortunately, slowed down the administrative process, 
established enormous backlogs, and left important policy areas 
untouched.  Louis J. Hector’s pessimistic 1959 memorandum about 
the CAB pointed out that formality was enormously inefficient as a 
182 MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION (1955); Warren E. Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach—
Which Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 658 (1957); Henry J. Friendly, 
A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 429 (1960); 
Louis J. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory 
Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Law and the 
Future: Administrative Law, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 174 (1956); William H. Timbers 
& Barry H. Garfinkel, Examination of the Commission’s Adjudicatory Process: 
Some Suggestions, 45 VA. L. REV. 817 (1959); Ernest Williams to the President’s 
Advisory Comm. on Gov’t Org. 8 (Sept. 14, 1956), Folder “No. 167 Regulatory
Agencies—General,” Box 20, PACGO Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential 
Library, Abilene, KS (DDEL).
183 BERNSTEIN, supra note 182. 
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 99; see also John B. Gage, Chairman’s Page, 11 ADMIN. L. BULL. 
203 (1959).
                                                 
Spring 2014 The Hearing Examiners 37
form of policy making, as it forced investigations into quasi-judicial 
clothing, bound by all of the APA’s procedural rules.189 Another 
scholar, observing the NLRB, concluded that the natural result of 
case-by-case policy making was that “the caldron of litigation 
becomes a nightmare version of that magic soup-producing pot of 
nursery tales which flooded the streets of the town.”190
Nor was it clear that due process was preserved by these 
procedures. As Hector charged, agencies “arc long on judicial form 
and short on judicial substance.”191 As he argued, although judicial 
trappings were provided in the initial hearing, examiners’ reports 
often mattered little in practice. 192 Contrary to skeptics’ earlier 
claims of vast examiner power, Hector and others now argued that 
administrative decisions were made later, based on “fact, policy, and 
legal questions” and by commissioners who had “little personal 
familiarity with the record.”193
Bernstein similarly suggested that decades of procedural 
reforms aimed at improving the examiners and the initial hearing 
were all for show, as the ultimate decision lay with commissioners 
themselves, whose decision-making processes were “rather casual 
and frequently unsystematic.”194 The disconnect between examiners, 
who observed procedural niceties but had little idea what the 
commissioners would do, and commissioners, who played fast and 
loose with procedure but had the ultimate authority to decide, called 
into question the amount of expertise involved in the decision-
making. 195 As Hector argued, “any resemblance between an 
examiner’s recommended decision and the final decision of the 
Board in a significant case is almost coincidental.”196 Thus, it was 
hardly surprising that, abandoned by Congress and the Executive 
branch, and with no incentives to work with other agencies and 
commissions, a commission naturally turned to the regulated parties 
189 Hector, supra note 182.
190 Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National 
Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 753 (1961).
191 Hector, supra note 182, at 931.
192 See id. at 945.
193 Id. at 944.
194 See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 319; see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE 
PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS (1st ed. 1959).
195 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 235.
196 Hector, supra note 182, at 945.
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themselves when it did make policy.197 The propriety of contacts 
between those inside and outside the agency became a newly 
contested question in the late 1950s as highly publicized evidence of 
preferential treatment called the idea of public interest regulation into 
question.198 Lawyers and reformers who had long been concerned 
with preventing examiners and agency staffers from talking to each 
other outside the presence of the regulated parties had generally seen 
the problem as the presence of an environment in which regulated 
parties could not participate.199 This focus on the harm of internal 
communications prevented lower-level employees from imposing 
their own views on examiners and agency heads, but ignored the 
possibility that external communications could do the same thing.
The question of commissioners’ unethical behavior flared into 
public controversy in 1957, as the House Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee’s Special Subcommittee on Legislative 
197 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 236.
198 For contemporary scholarship on the “capture critique,” see Hugh Heclo, A
GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS IN WASHINGTON (1997); Hugh 
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Oversight, established to look into the affairs of the major 
independent commissions, publicized the close relationships 
industries cultivated with commissioners, the favors they exchanged, 
and the rampant conflicts of interest that resulted. 200 In the 
subcommittee’s final report on these matters (released in January 
1959), members focused on the broader damage the revelations had 
done to “the widespread confidence of the public in the fairness and 
integrity of the operations of governmental institutions.” 201 A
proposed 1960 bill attempted to ban “ex parte” communications for 
both internal and external matters—the first time that external 
influence on the commissioners was deemed as important as internal 
influence on the examiners.202
VII. THE SECOND HOOVER COMMISSION’S TASK FORCE ON LEGAL 
SERVICES AND PROCEDURE (1953–1955)
As lawyers inside and outside the administrative process 
looked askance at its slow and plodding nature, there was 
considerably less enthusiasm for new plans to remake the 
administrative process in the image of the federal courts.  The major 
effort to do so in the 1950s was conducted by the second Hoover 
Commission’s Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure, which 
suggested that the administrative process still failed to provide 
regulated parties with fair hearings.  It recommended shifting as 
much administrative work as possible out of the hands of bureaucrats 
and hearing examiners and into the hands of judges.  The first and 
second Hoover Commissions were established by Republicans in 
Congress interested in reducing the size and cost of government.203
200 See DAVID A. FRIER, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE EISENHOWER 
ADMINISTRATION (1969); SCHWARTZ, supra note 194; R. W. Lishman, 
“Independence” in the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 13 ADMIN. L. REV. 133 
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Influence Peddling, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796 (1958); Louis L. Jaffe, The Scandal in 
TV Licensing, HARPER’S MONTHLY, Sept. 1957, at 77.
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COMMISSIONS, H.R. REP. 104-2711, at 60 (1959).
202 H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, INDEPENDENT 
REGULATORY AGENCIES ACT OF 1960, H.R. REP. 86-2070, at 15 (2d Sess. 1960).
203 For more on the two Hoover Commissions, see PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING 
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The second Hoover Commission’s task force on legal services and 
procedure, however, focused instead on questions of fairness and due 
process in the administrative state.204
The task force comprised several practicing lawyers, many 
with administrative experience, including Ross L. Malone Jr. of New 
Mexico (a former deputy attorney general of the United States) and 
San Francisco lawyer (and former special assistant to the attorney 
general) Herbert Watson Clark.205 Several judges also served on the 
task force, including Judge Elbert Parr Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals (a former general counsel for the Treasury 
Department) and Judge Harold R. Medina of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals.206 They were joined by Montana State University 
president Carl McFarland, University of Michigan Law School dean 
E. Blythe Stason, and former Harvard law dean and experienced 
administrator James M. Landis.207 Arthur Vanderbilt, chief justice of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court and Justice Robert H. Jackson were 
included as consultants to the task force.208 Few of the members 
were strangers to one another; McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt 
had joined together in dissent twelve years earlier on the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure in calling for 
greater independence for hearing examiners and more judicial 
review,209 and several other members had worked with one another 
through the ABA.  The task force’s recommendations were 
significantly informed by the legal training and political preferences 
of its members, who continued to fear administrative discretion and 
sought to judicialize administrative procedure far beyond the flexible 
measures established in the APA.210 Articulating one of the task 
SERV., EXECUTIVE BRANCH REORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW (1977); RONALD C.
MOE, THE HOOVER COMMISSIONS REVISITED (1982); Harvey C. Mansfield, 
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Sess. 1941).
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force’s guiding assumptions, task force members emphasized that 
“[t]he more closely that administrative procedures can be made to 
conform to judicial procedures, the greater the probability that 
justice will be attained in the administrative process.”211
Much of the task force’s critique centered, as so many earlier 
ones had, on agencies’ formal hearings.212 Although the APA had 
separated investigation, prosecution, and adjudication functions 
within each agency, and kept the hearing examiners relatively 
insulated from other officials, the task force found that major revision 
of the APA was needed “to strengthen it as the charter of due process 
of law in administrative proceedings.”213 Abandoning the APA’s 
guiding principles of flexibility and deference to agency decision-
making, members proposed a new administrative code that would 
remake the administrative process in the image of the federal trial 
courts, adopting the pretrial procedures, discovery rules, and rules of 
evidence used in civil trials. 214 The separation of investigation, 
prosecution, and judicial functions provided in formal hearings was 
to be extended to licensing, rate making, rulemaking, informal 
hearings, and the final decisions of the agency—all areas in which 
Services, Procedures, and Representations: A Discussion of the Hoover Report and 
the Administration of the Department of the Interior, 50 NW. U. L. REV. 726 
(1956); Kenneth Culp Davis, Evidence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (1955); J. Forrester 
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Observations on the Hoover Commission Report, 24 GEO. L. WASH. REV. 656 
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the interplay of expert administrative staffers had been designed to 
improve cooperation and lead to better regulation overall.215
At the same time, examiners—renamed “hearing 
commissioners” to make their quasi-judicial status clear—were to be 
of higher caliber and further isolated from the agencies in which they 
worked.216 Finding that CSC’s experience in evaluating executive 
officers had translated poorly to evaluations of legal and quasi-
judicial personnel, the task force recommended that responsibility for 
hiring and firing be transferred from the CSC to a Chief Hearing 
Commissioner, under the authority of a new administrative court.217
As hearing commissioners mastered their newly judicialized role, the 
task force proposed that they become more powerful. 218 The 
decisions of hearing commissioners were to have as much authority 
as the decisions of trial courts when reviewed by federal appellate 
courts.219 Hearing commissioners’ findings of fact would be final 
unless the agency on review determined that the findings were clearly 
erroneous. 220 This would have empowered the hearing 
commissioners while stripping authority from the commission.  The 
task force recommended that agency heads and commissioners
should still have a free hand regarding “policy” decisions, but their 
failure to clarify what this meant suggested that the limits of the 
examiners’ authority would be newly broad and undefined.221
These proposals legitimized agency decision-making only 
insofar as it looked like judicial decision-making was just the
beginning.  Judicial review of agency decisions was to be more 
rigorous, and, clearly uncomfortable with the quasi-judicial authority 
Congress had repeatedly vested in agencies to make policy, the task 
force further recommended moving such functions out of the 
agencies entirely, into a new and independent administrative court.  
The Legal Services and Procedure recommendations were thus, at 
their core, calling for a vast reconstruction of the administrative state.  
Whatever jurisdiction could not be transferred to the courts would be 
so hemmed in by procedure, so subject to judicial scrutiny, and so 
215 Id. at 216.
216 Id.
217 HOOVER COMMISSION II, supra note 213, at 2.  
218 Id.
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isolated from that of other administrators as to be virtually 
unrecognizable.
This proposal to drastically make over the administrative 
process was viewed skeptically by several members of the Hoover 
Commission, by the agencies, and by the Eisenhower White House, 
all of whom feared putting so much authority in the hearing 
examiners.  As one Hoover Commission staffer warned, putting 
almost final decision-making authority in hearing examiners 
“assumes vast powers of intelligence and comprehension in hearing 
examiners” and “could be the most irresponsible class of officials in 
the Government.”222 As Hoover commissioner Joseph P. Kennedy 
remarked to John Hollister, another commissioner, 
I assure you that, as Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, I didn’t conceive of my job to 
be to accept the decisions of any hearing examiner or 
to review his work for major errors.  His responsibility 
was to dig out the facts; it was my responsibility to 
use those facts in the manner in which I believed 
Congress wanted them used.223
Others widely criticized the idea that the rule of law required 
so much change.224 Louis Jaffe suggested that the report “so insists 
on the judicialization of the administrative process that it ends by 
refusing to recognize its existence.”225 Law professor Ralph Fuchs 
sharply criticized the commission’s proposals regarding internal 
separation of functions, arguing that to deprive hearing 
222 Letter from Jarold A. Kieffer, Assistant to Arthur S. Flemming, to Arthur S. 
Flemming, Comm’r, U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n 6, 9 (Mar. 9, 1955), Folder 
“COEBG, 53–55: Legal Services and Procedure (1),” Box 86, Arthur Flemming 
Papers, DDEL.
223 Letter from Joseph P. Kennedy, member, First and Second Hoover 
Comm’ns, to Solomon C. Hollister, member, Second Hoover Comm’n 2 (Mar. 11, 
1955), Folder “Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure Misc. Correspondence 
Folder #1 10/17/53–1/12/54,” Box 3, Hoover Commission II, Herbert Hoover 
Papers, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West 
Branch, IA.
224 See infra notes 225–226 and accompanying text.
225 Louis L. Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1296 
(1955).
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commissioners of accumulated agency expertise would “cut the heart 
out of administrative processes.” 226
The ABA picked up the slack through its own Special 
Committee on Legal Services and Procedure. 227 The ABA had 
sought greater uniformity and increased judicialization since the 
APA, and soon drafted a Code of Administrative Procedure that 
closely resembled the Hoover Commission’s code.228 Although the 
ABA spent the next several years drafting bills and pressing for 
reform, strong opposition from agencies and commissions, 
administrative practitioners, and the Attorney General meant little 
was accomplished.  By the early 1960s, the Senate Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure concluded that the ABA’s 
proposed code appeared “inconsistent with any real attempt to reduce 
delay and expense.”229 Further judicializing the administrative state 
to ensure fairness through independence had become a losing battle.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Developments in administrative procedure during the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations suggest how much the 
context for discussing administrative law had changed.  Concerns 
that examiners were neither fair nor capable enough gave way to 
concerns about administrators’ lack of enthusiasm and examiners’ 
proceduralism.  Reformers using fairness arguments to press for more 
examiner independence found these arguments less salient.  James 
M. Landis’s critical report to president-elect John Kennedy in 1960 
indicated just how much conversations about the administrative 
process had shifted and how many long-standing complaints earlier 
reform efforts had managed to ignore.230 Failed attempts by the 
second Hoover Commission and the ABA to further limit 
226 Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports on Legal 
Services and Procedure, 31 IND. L.J. 1, 30 (1955).
227 GRISINGER, UNWIELDY, supra note 1, at 226.
228 Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 81 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 369, 383 
(1956); Report of the Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure, 81 
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 491 (1956); see also Dante B. Fascell, The Problem of 
Complexities and Delays in Administrative Proceedings and Practice, 12 ADMIN.
L. BULL. 6 (1959).
229 S. JUDICIARY COMM., ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, S. REP.
NO. 87-168, at 11 (1st Sess. 1961). 
230 Landis, supra note 4. 
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administrative discretion through onerous court-like procedures and 
expansive judicial review suggested that both interested observers 
and regulated parties were embracing new understandings of the 
problems of the administrative state. 
This contrast suggests the gradual consolidation and 
acceptance of the administrative state in the post–New Deal era.  The 
idea of “bureaucrats run amok” was no longer as terrifying as it had 
been even a decade earlier.  By 1960, administrative agencies and 
independent regulatory commissions were familiar features of the 
federal landscape, and the ABA’s feverish visions of “administrative 
absolutism” had given way to new concerns about slow and plodding 
administrators elsewhere in the agency.  Discussions about examiner 
independence would take place in terms of professionalization, not 
presumptive unfairness.  In addition, administrative experiments in 
health, welfare, safety, and environmental regulation in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s indicated a new focus in administrative politics.231
Responding to complaints about existing agencies’ failure to state 
broad principles of policy and their preference for adjudication, many 
of the new statutes explicitly instructed the new agencies to make 
policy through rulemaking instead of case-by-case adjudication—
bypassing the examiners entirely. In addition, in response to 
“capture” critiques, agencies opened up the regulatory process; 
“public participation” would become the new touchstone of 
231 Hugh Davis Graham, Since 1964: The Paradox of American Civil Rights 
Regulation, in TAKING STOCK: AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 187 (Morton Keller & R. Shep Melnick, eds., 1999); RICHARD A.
HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF 
TWO AGENCIES (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Graham, Since 1964]; Robert A. Kagan, 
Adversarial Legalism and American Government, in THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC 
POLICY (Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995); JERRY L. MASHAW &
DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990); 
David Vogel, The New Social Regulation in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 155–85 
(Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981); Hugh Davis Graham, Legacies of the 1960s: The 
American ‘Rights Revolution’ in an Era of Divided Governance, 10 J. POL’Y HIST.
267 (1998) [hereinafter Graham, Legacies of the 1960s]; Alan B. Morrison, The 
Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253 
(1986); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 
YALE L.J. 38 (1975); Schiller, supra note 198.
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reform.232 The “problem” of the administrative state—once that of 
powerless citizens against a powerful state—was now the reverse.
232 BERNSTEIN, supra note 182; Graham, Since 1964, surpa note 231; HARRIS 
& MILKIS, supra note 231; Hugh Heclo, The Sixties’ False Dawn: Awakenings, 
Movements, and Postmodern Policy-Making, in INTEGRATING THE SIXTIES: THE 
ORIGINS, STRUCTURES, AND LEGITIMACY OF PUBLIC POLICY IN A TURBULENT 
DECADE 34 (Brian Balogh ed., 1996); Kagan, supra note 231; LOWI, supra note 2; 
MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 231; MCCRAW, supra note 2; SUNSTEIN, supra
note 231; Vogel, supra note 231; Graham, Legacies of the 1960s, supra note 231; 
Merrill, supra note 198; Sidney M. Milkis, Remaking Government Institutions in 
the 1970s: Participatory Democracy and the Triumph of Administrative Politics, 
10 J. POL'Y HIST. 51 (1998); Morrison, supra note 231; Pedersen, Jr., supra note 
231; Rabin, supra note 2; Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity, 
supra note 2; Schiller, supra note 198; Stewart, supra note 2; Verkuil, supra note
43.
                                                 
